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NOTES

so as to preserve the requirements of due process. Justice Rutledge of the United
States Supreme Court, appears to have summed up the situation quite nicely
when he said, ...restrictions upon authority for securing personal liberty, as
well as fairness in trial to deprive one of it, are always inconvenient-to the
authority so restricted." 29
JACK D. JoxEs.

LIABILITY OF

A

CAR OWNER FOR

A

THIEF'S NEGLIE-NCE

An interesting question of tort liability arises when an automobile owner,
upon parking his car, fails to remove the keys from the ignition, the car is
stolen, and the thief subsequently negligently injures a third party. Should the
car owner be held liable to the third party for his carelessness in failing to take
adequate precautions against the theft of his car?
In answering this question, the courts have shown little agreement, in
either approach or solution to the problem. In general, decisions have been
rendered on the basis of proximate cause, emphasizing intervening factors, or a
duty owed by the car owner to the third party, usually legislatively imposed.
Courts talking in terms of proximate cause have ordinarily denied recovery from
the defendant, often holding that the theft and later negligence of the thief
were intervening factors, breaking the casual connection between the owner's
original negligence and the plaintiff's injury.) The Minnesota court has held
that the plaintiff could not recover because his injury was too far removed in
time and place from the scene of the theft,2 suggesting directness of harm as a
test for proximate cause. In none of these decisions did the courts look to the
applicable statute or ordinance prohibiting leaving ignition keys in a parked
auto, in defining the extent of the defendant's liability.
In the absence of statutes or ordinances prohibiting such conduct, courts
have also used proximate cause extensively. Two New York decisions,.? without
elaborating, held that the plaintiff's injury was not proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence. In contrast is a 1944 District of Columbia decision,4
unusual in that it is the only case to have held, without citing a statute, that
the question of defendant's negligence and whether it was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injury, should be submitted to the jury.
See In Re Oliver, 333
curring opinion).
1. Galbraith v. Levin, 81
359, 61 N.E. (2d) 330
778 (1927) ; Squires v.
939 (1926).

29.

U. S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 511, 92 L. Ed. 491 (1948)

(con-

N.E. (2d) 560 (Mass., 1948); Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass.
(1945); Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E.
Brooks, 44 App. D.C. 320 (1916), cited 3-3 Decennial Digest

2. Wannebo v. Gates 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W. (2d) 695 (1948).
3. Walyer v. Bond, 292 N.Y. 574, 54 N.E. (2d) 691 (1944); Wilson v. Harrington,

295 N.Y. 667, 65 N.E. (2d) 101 (1946).
4. Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., 79 App. D.C. 320, 144 F. (2d) 532 (1944).
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Massachusetts has adjudicated the question more often than any other
state, four times, and has denied recovery on the basis of intervening factors in
three of those decisions.5 The remaining case allowed plaintiff to recover, 6 but
the factual situation there was complicated by the defendant's violation of the
state automobile registration statute, and the decision has thus been distinguished
7
by the Massachusetts court in later opinions.
It is thus seen that among the courts considering the problem as one of
proximate cause, three distinct approaches emerge: 1. The Massachusetts view
that the thief's activities are independent, intervening factors, relieving the
defendant from liability; 2. The Minnesota view that recovery will not be
allowed when the plaintiff's injury is far removed in time and place from the
scene of the theft; and, 3, the Distrcit of Columbia view that the question of
proximate cause should be left to the jury, thus not disqualifying plaintiff, as a
matter of law, from recovery.
Courts that have considered the problem on the basis of defendant's special
duty to the plaintiff fall into two general categories. The first of these is based
on a legislatively imposed duty, arising out of the particular statute or ordinance
that prohibits leaving the ignition keys in a parked automobile. A 1943 District
of Columbia decision,8 overruling an earlier case that had denied plaintiff recovery on proximate cause considerations, 9 held that the ordinance imposed a
duty on the defendant, reasoning that a purpose of the ordinance was to protect
society from a thief's reckless management of a stolen car. The Illinois court
in a 1948 case of first impression,1 0 adopted the District of Columbia reasoning,
holding the defendant liable because of a state statute, though the statute, like
the ordinance, by its terms did not specifically disclose that one of its purposes
was to protect the public from negligently managed cars stolen from careless
owners.

Other courts to apply the duty concept have done so in the absence of
statutes. An early Louisiana casell and a 1947 Maine decisionl 2 reasoned in
terms of foresecability, holding that the defendant could not reasonably be expected to foresee the theft of his car and subsequent careless operation by a thief,
and thus had violated no duty he owed the plaintiff. This view, when added
to the District of Columbia and Illinois holdings, and the three different
approaches taken by courts along proximate cause lines, makes a total of five
distinct ways in which the courts have dealt with the problem.
Whether the Wyoming court would adopt any of these methods of approach
were the question to arise in this state, is a matter of pure conjecture, since
S. See note 1, supra, Galbraith v. Levin; Sullivan v. Griffin; Slater v. T. C. Baker Co.
6. Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E. (2d) 1001 (1941).
7. See note 1, supra, Galbraith v. Levin; Sullivan v. Griffin.
8. Ross v. Hartman, 44- App. D.C. 320, 139 F. (2d) 14 (1943), cert, denied 321 U.S.
790.
9. See note 1, supra, Squires v. Brooks.
10. Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E. (2d) 537 (1942).
11. Castay v. Katz and Besthoff, Ltd., 147 La. 504, 148 So. 76 (1933).
12. Curtis v. Jacobson, 54 A. (2d) 520 (Me., 1947).

NOTES

helpful dicta is scarce, although the Wyoming court has stated that violation
of a statute is at least evidence of negligence. 13 Unfortunately, however, Wyoming's pertinent statutelM is similar to those cited in the cases discussed in that it
gives little indication of the express purpose for which it was passed, so that the
Wyoming court could cite the statute as creating a duty, or not consider it at
all, and have authority from other jurisdictions for so doing.
In determining which of the five approaches used thus far by the courts is
most desirable, it is submitted that considerations of public policy should be
controlling. With 35,000,000 automobiles on our roads and a correspondingly
great number of car thefts taking place, it is desirable, in view of the great
number of car accidents, that the car owner be under a strict duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent the theft of his car for the protection of those using
streets and highways. With the imposition of a strict duty, it is reasonable to
expect a reduction in car thefts and accidents caused by a thief's haste to leave
the scene of his crime. When the car owner fails to fulfill his duty and an injury
results, holding the owner liable will serve to protect the innocent plaintiff and
at the same time tend to distribute the loss over society as a whole, since liability
automobile insurance will cover the defendant's loss, provided he is thoughtful
enough to have purchased it.
Until the legislatures impose such a duty on the car owner in explicit terms,
use of existing statutes by the courts, as has been done in Illinois and the Distriet
of Columbia, is a possible solution to the difficulty encountered in finding liability
when concepts of proximate cause are adhered to. An alternative approach which
can be used in the absence of statute or ordinance is the finding of a special duty
arising out of the plaintiff's being within the zone of defendant's foreseeability
of harm, since it can reasonably be contended that a car owner can foresee the
possibility of the theft and later negligent management of his car, and the danger
he is thus exposing persons to within the zone of the thief's area of escape, when
the owner has failed to safeguard his car from theft.
RICHARD

S.

DOWNEY.

13. Hester v. Coliseum Motor Co., 41 Wyo. 345, 285 Pac. 781 (1930).
14. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 60-530. "Duty of Operator when Leaving Vehicle
standing.-No person driving or in charge of motor vehicle shall permit it to
stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, and

removing the key, . . ."

